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In issues No. 36 and 37 (October 1983 and April 1984) of Indonesia, readers 
were offered a ten ta tiv e , preliminary analysis of the drastic, interrelated 
changes in the structure and leadership of the Armed Forces which began in 
March 1983. Issue No. 36 was devoted largely to the political coming of age 
of the "men of AMN," or the postrevolutionary officers who started  to graduate 
from the Military Academy (located at Magelang, Central Java) in 1960. Issue 
No. 37, on the other hand, focused on the consequences of implementing Law 
20/1982, which separated the functions of Minister of Defense and Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces, and created distinct bureaucracies under each (far 
the more powerful being the pyramid under Commander-in-Chief General L. "Benny" 
Murdani). The present text is intended to complete the series by looking at 
the "reorganization" set in motion in the spring of 1985 and scheduled for 
completion by April 1, 1986. Though a few personnel decisions remain to be 
taken, the general character of this reorganization is clear and its political 
implications at least partially decipherable. In any event, it is apparent that 
by next spring not only will the reorganization be complete, but all three armed 
forces, as well as the police, will be fully in the hands of the postrevolutionary 
generation of officers, leaving only a few key positions in the Armed Forces’ 
Headquarters (Mabes ABRI) still held by an inner coterie of Murdani old-timers. 
In this sense the year 1985-86 will be as historic a turning point for the 
military in Indonesian politics as were 1945-46 and 1965-66.
What is the essential nature of the recent reorganization? In formal 
terms, it has meant the liquidation of a whole tier of overstaffed, combined- 
service interregional commands—the Kowilhan and Kostranas—and the consolidation 
of units of control at the regional level. 1 As far as the Army is concerned, 
the former sixteen Regional Commands (Kodam I-X, XII-XVII) have been amalgamated 
into ten new-style Regional Commands, producing a structure strikingly reminiscent 
of the seven "TT" (Tentara dan Territorium) of the early 1950s, before the 
onset of regional warlordism and self-conscious policies of ethnic divide 
and rule by Jakarta. 2 Thus the new Kodam 1 (an amalgamation of Kodam I—III) 
covers almost the same zone as the old TT/I (adding only the Natuna Islands), 
while Kodam 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (ex-Kodam IV, VI, VII, VIII, and an amalgam of 
IX, X, and XII), coincide with the old TT/II, TT/III, TT/IV, TT/V, and TT/VI. 
Kodam 7 (merging Kodam XIII and XIV) covers the core of what was earlier TT/VII. 
Where the organization of 1985 differs from that of 1955, the explanation lies
1. The four Kowilhan were disbanded by Murdani between July 6 and 15, 1985. 
Kostranas followed on the 16th.
2. Sinar Harapan, March 16, 1985, contains a well-informed article by military 
specialist Atmadji, which discusses in detail the similarities and differences 





(from Sinar Harapan, March 16, 1985)
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in contemporary politico-military exigencies. The shape Of Kodam 8 (combining 
Kodam XVI [Maluku] and XVII [Irian Jaya]), with its headquarters in Jayapura, 
reflects serious concern with the OPM (Free Papua Organization) insurgency 
and the massive, embarrassing flight of thousands of Irianese across the border 
in to  Papua-New Guinea. Similarly Kodam 9 (ex-Kodam XVI) exists primarily 
for e ffic ien t prosecution of the continuing war against Fretilin nationalist 
resistance in occupied East Timor.3 45 Kodam 10 (ex-Kodam V), on the other hand, 
contro ls th e  p o litically  crucial m etro p o litan  region of Jakarta—the zone 
where any successful coup would have to be mounted.
A number of former Kodam have been degraded to the status of Military 
Resort Commands (Korem), analogous to the Komando Distrik Militer (KDM) of the 
early 1950s—for example, the old Kodam IX (East Kalimantan), X (South Kalimantan), 
and XV (Maluku); others represent small clusters of Korem, e.g., the old Kodam 
I (Aceh), II (North Sumatra), III (West Sumatra/Riau), XII (West Kalimantan), 
XIII (North Sulawesi), XIV (South Sulawesi), and XVII (Irian Jaya). Murdani 
has stated that he expects eventually there will be approximately forty such 
Korem altogether: *
No. of No. of
Korem Korem





Kodam 4 4 (Java 12)
Kodam 6 3 Kodam 7 5 (Kalimantan 3, Sulawesi 5)
Kodam 8 4 Kodam 9 4 (Maluku-Irian Jaya 4, Lesser Sundas 4)
All the new Kodam commanders are to have the same rank, Major-General, in 
contrast to previous practice where the Kodam commanders in Java typically 
had ranks one step higher than those in the Outer Islands.3
In this context, it is significant that all the previous territo ria l infantry 
brigades have been liquidated, officially on the grounds that they have proved 
very expensive and unwieldy, and in practice never took the field as brigade­
sized units. Their component battalions are now mostly to be assigned to the 
administrative and operational control of the Korem commanders, with each Korem 
having at least one such battalion as its local "strike force" (alat pemukul). 
Each Kodam commander will have only a single battalion directly under his 
personal command. Furthermore, each city where a Kodam is headquartered (i.e., 
Medan, Palembang, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Banjarmasin, Makasar, Jayapura, 
and Denpasar) will form a separate Komando Militer Kota (KMK) with its own 
commander (all Kodim [Komando Distrik Militer, Military District Commands]
3. The same Sinar Harapan article sta tes explicitly that the Lesser Sundas 
and Bali were originally supposed to be part of Kodam 5 (East Java) or 7 (Sula­
wesi), but that the problem of East Timor convinced the authorities to maintain 
the old Kodam XVI as a new Kodam 9 (Nusatenggara).
4. See his interview with Tempo, May 4, 1985.
5. Tempo, May 4, 1985.
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in these KMK will be eliminated as well). 6 These changes, which underline 
the very limited military power directly a t the Kodam commanders' disposal, 
suggest that in some ways their role will be more like that of the former 
Kowilhan commanders than that of the powerful Kodam commanders of the 1950s. 
An additional development of some importance is the inauguration of specialized 
so c ia l-p o litical staffs at both the Kodam and Korem levels, whose mission 
is ostensibly the handling of what promise to be pressing problems of finding 
employment for supernumerary military personnel. ?
If one compares the levels of command in the new Army hierarchy with those 
of the existing civil administration, one notices that they tend to coincide 
only a t the lower rungs. A Kodim still typically corresponds to a civilian 
kabupat'en. But the Korem are generally equivalent to the long-abolished Residency 
(karesidenan), while most Kodam cover a cluster of Provinces (propinsi).
Commander-in-Chief/Minister of the Interior
This pattern  is likely to have curious consequences insofar as most provincial 
governors are still very high-ranking retired military officers. The example 
of West Java, where the Kodam commander is a Major-General (R. I. Siregar), the
6. For further detail on these changes, see Atmadji's article in Sinar Harapart, 
March 16, 1985, cited above.
7. According to  Angkatan Bersenjata, April 10, 1985, a new Assistant for 
Social and Political Affairs will be attached to each Kodam's Chief of Staff, 
while th e  Korem will g e t s ta ff  officers for social-political affairs. The 
organizational implications of all this are rather obscure. Hitherto, "social 
and political affairs" have been handled by the local Assistants for Intelligence 
(Aspam), Territorial Affairs (Aster), and Karyawan, or Functional Group, Affairs 
(Asyawan). How their turf will be shared with the new Assistants may prove 
to be a ticklish problem. For further discussion and analysis, see Lincoln 
Kaye's long article in Far Eastern Economic Review, October 24, 1985, pp. 23-26.
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Governor a Lieutenant-General (Yogie Suwardi Memet), and the Korem commanders 
colonels, will probably become more frequent, with all the attendant conflicts 
of authority and complications of protocol.
Another change of major importance for the distribution of power within the 
Army is the further centralization of control over its elite combat units in 
the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. In August 1985, the old Kopur I and II 
(Battle Commands I and II) within Kostrad were abolished and replaced by Opera­
tio n a l Divisions I and II, both headquartered in the immediate vicinity of 
Jakarta. 8 The appearance of these novel division-size operational units serves 
to underline the effective elimination of the time-honored territorial divisions 
(especially  Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya) as more than sentimental 
memories. Alongside Kostrad and its Operational Divisions stand the Special 
Forces (Kopassus, formerly Kopassandha) or Red Berets, and the recently (1984) 
formed Fast Reaction Strike Force (Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat), or Green 
Berets, a special elite unit directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, for 
deployment in case of urban riots, hijackings, and other spectacular emergencies. 
(A nother important, and increasingly visible force, this time not under the 
control of the Commander-in-Chief, is the Presidential Security Squad [Pasukan 
Pengawal Presiden—Paswalpres]).
Parallel to these changes in the Army are no less striking reorganizations 
within the Navy and Air Force, which also have their political implications. 
The most significant innovation in both services is the elimination of the 
prevailing "general staff" leadership structure inherited from the la te  1950s 
and 1960s, when, with Sukarno's encouragement, the Navy and Air Force organized 
themselves as much as possible on lines comparable to, and rivalrous with, the 
Army. Under the new system the Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff will each 
be assisted by three powerful Deputies (for Operations, Personnel, and Logistics); 
and each Deputy will supervise the work of three or four semiautonomous Direc­
torates, each headed by a Director. Alongside this bureaucratic pyramid will 
be ranged some specialized agencies and a central operational command. 9
In the case of the Air Force, the seven Regional Air Commands (Komando 
Daerah Angkatan Udara—Kodau) have been eliminated, to make way for two vast 
Operational Commands (Komando Operasional—Koops): one based in Jakarta covering 
western Indonesia along a line running north from the West-Central Java border 
to roughly the West Kalimantan-South Kalimantan divide, the other, based in 
Makasar, covering the eastern half of the archipelago. Both commands are to 
be directly subordinated, for operational purposes, to the Commander of the 
National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas), a senior officer attached to Armed 
Forces' Headquarters. In turn the Operational Commands will control all but 
th re e  of the  country's air bases (those at Yogyakarta, Solo, and Bandung, 
used mainly for training purposes, will remain under the authority of the 
Air Force’s Education Command [Kodikau]). On each base the old dualism of 
control between the air base commander and the local wing commander has been 
liquidated in the  form er's favor. Finally, the status of the Air Force's 
elite strike force, Kopasgat (Komando Pasukan Gerak Cepat), a sort of rival
8. These two commands will be held by graduates of AMN Class 2 (1961); the 46- 
year-old Col. Warsito, former commander of Korem 084 (Surabaya), and Col. Muslim 
Massewa, former commander of Korem 141 (Watampone). See Angkatan Bersenjata, 
August 9 and 10, 1985.
9. See the detailed account given in Atmadji's column in Sinar Harapan, April 1, 
1985.
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to the army's Kopassandha/Kopassus and the Navy’s Marines, has been severely 
reduced; it will no longer function as a single, coherent unit, but will have 
its personnel spread out in small groups at various strategic locations. 1°
Something rather similar has happened to the Navy. The old and prestigious 
Armada has been split into two—a Western Armada based in Jakarta (eventually 
in Teluk Ratai, South Lampung) and an Eastern Armada based in Surabaya. The 
previous eight Regional Naval Commands (Komando Daerah Angkatan Laut—Kodaeral) 
have been swept away (creating a problem of finding jobs for 3,000-4,000 super­
fluous personnel). Various naval bases are to be rationalized into two 
tiers—roughly five fully equipped First Class Bases (Pangkalan Utama Angkatan 
Laut—Lantamal), and a larger number of more skeletally furnished local instal­
la tio n s. 12 In both services it is expected that in the future the Chiefs 
of Staff will be three-star officers; the Deputies and Fleet/Operational Command 
commanders two-star; and the Directors and (major) base commanders one-star.
These reforms have at least two political implications. On the one hand, 
they further reduce the status and autonomy of both Navy and Air Force, whose 
inner structures now more resemble those of the Department of Defense and 
Security and the Police than that of the Army. Their functions, too, are to 
be larg ely  adm inistrative and technical in character. Neither service will 
any longer have regional command levels that in any way parallel or rival the 
Army’s Kodam and Korem. On the other hand, operational control of the fighting 
arms of both services has been even more securely monopolized by Mabes ABRI 
in the person of the Commander-in-Chief. It is safe now to say that at no 
previous time in Indonesia's history has a military man on active service had 
such complete control of the country's fire power as General Murdani.
What has been the official rationale for these enormous changes? The basic 
ju stific a tio n  has been an explicitly formulated shift in the mission of the 
armed services. General Murdani is on record as stating th at the changes are 
"based on the assumption that a conventional war, such as World War II, the 
Korean War, or the Iran-Iraq conflict, will not occur in island Southeast Asia 
for th e  indefinite future" and that therefore "today, the emphasis remains 
on in te rn a l security—problems of social disorder, subversion, and so on."i3 
Given this mission, it is logical that the Air Force and Navy, primarily designed 
for wars with external enemies, should take a back seat. The prime roles are 
to be taken by the Army and by the Police (which is soon to be greatly expanded 
and technically upgraded). 1* Additional reasons offered have been the need
10. Ibid.
11. These potential unemployment figures were given personally by Admiral 
Romly, the Navy Chief of Staff. He added that the number of flag rank officers 
(i.e ., admirals) would soon be reduced from the traditional 70 or so to 46. 
Sinar Harapan, June 14, 1985, as cited in Indonesia Reports 9 (July 1985): 37. 
This may be the appropriate place to record the unique service that John A. 
MacDougall has done to all Indonesianists by preparing and publishing this 
detailed, day-by-day log of current developments in Indonesia.
12. Sinar Harapan, April 1, 1985, and Surabaya Post, May 15, 1985.
13. Tempo, May 4, 1985.
14. Testifying before Commission III of the DPR (Parliament) in early October 
1984, National Police Chief Police General Anton Sudjarwo said that the current 
size of the Police (150,000 men) would be increased to 180,000 by 1989, and
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for budgetary austerity in worsening economic circumstances (the technology-heavy 
Navy and Air Force are man for man much the most expensive services to maintain); 
the importance of increasing efficiency by cutting out duplication of functions, 
padded bureaucratic hierarchies, and irrelevant formal parallelisms; and the 
rapid decline in the number of officers available for key functions, as the 
huge 1945 Generation goes finally into retirem ent and the quite small, early 
(1960s) graduating classes of the AMN take over military leadership, “is
All th ese  rationales support Murdani’s contention that the reforms are 
intended to produce for the first time in Indonesia a professional military 
establishment constructed on conventional international lines; and thus (though 
Murdani does not quite say so) to eliminate the top-heavy, inefficient, politicized 
structures inherited from the Revolution and the Sukarno years. Murdani has 
repeatedly put great emphasis on new requirements for promotion to key posts, 
and the replacement of the 1945 Generation’s loose camaraderie by a more imper­
sonal, competitive spirit. It used to be, he noted in a significant interview 
with Tempo, that military jobs were allocated according to whether you were 
”BTM” (Berjuang Terus-Menerus—Never Absent from the Struggle), i.e., had 
participated in the Revolution and in the military’s various postrevolutionary 
campaigns. Now the four chief criteria will be: 1) loyalty to Pancasila ideology; 
2) fighting spirit and professional ability; 3) personal integrity; and 4) morals. 
He indicated his expectation that in the future there will be hundreds of 
colonels competing intensively for 40-50 general officer positions. The ultimate 
target is for no more than 10 percent of military personnel to be officers, 
i.e., approximately 2,500 for the Army and 270 to 300 each for the Navy and 
Air Force.''6 There can be little  doubt th at in all this Murdani is not merely 
speaking for efficiency and rationalization, but consciously retailoring promotion 
criteria to the backgrounds and aspirations of the now dominant postrevolutionary 
g en era tio n  of m ilitary officers. These people may not like the stress on 
tig h t com petition, but they will certainly appreciate the explicit end to 
BTM-ism and all it stands for.
How easily have these changes been accomplished, and what, if any, problems 
are likely to arise on their account? To all appearances things have gone 
quite smoothly, a tribute to Murdani’s personal authority and capable political 
management. At the same time it is obvious that serious criticisms have been 
voiced within the military, and anxiety continues with regard to developments 
over the longer haul. Murdani himself has said that he has been reproached by 
”bapak-bapak kita" (i.e., retired members of the Generation of ’45) for leading 
the Army away from its traditions towards a professional army on American or 
Japanese lines; 17 and for quietly beginning the abandonment of the doctrine of 
dw if ling si (dual function) which legitimizes permanent military control over *1567
that a high school diploma, rather than merely an elementary school certificate,
would henceforth be required for candidacy as a police officer. See Indonesia
Reports 1 (November 1984): 12.
15. A ngkatan B ersenjata, June 18, 1985, describes the current reactivation 
of the old separately located service academies, and the effective reduction 
of Akabri to a shell. Compare the comments of Akabri’s incumbent Commander- 
General, Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja, as reported in Sinar Harapan, 
February 13, 1985, cited in Indonesia Reports 5 (March 1985): 46.
16. Tempo, May 4, 1985.
17. Ibid.
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the country's political life. Indeed, he did at one point appear to question 
publicly whether in the longer term the doctrine will be maintained."*8 (Perhaps 
because the  in te rn a l military reaction was unfavorable, Murdani has since 
strongly reemphasized his commitment to dwifungsi, most recently in a heavily 
publicized speech to the politically important Annual Working Conference of 
the Armed Forces' Social and Political Affairs Officers.)"!8 At the same time, 
no one who has followed General Murdani or watched his "style” since becoming 
Commander-in-Chief would accuse him of political self-abnegation or failing 
to safeguard the political interests of the officer corps. Some conspicuous 
recent examples of his thoughtfulness are: the "dropping" (titipan ) of AMN 
g rad u ate, class of 1961, Brig. Gen. S. Nugroho, a long-time personal aide, 
into the post of Under Attorney-General (Jaksa Agung Muda) for Intelligence 
Affairs; 20 the designation of the obscure Brig. Gen. C. J. Rantung as Governor 
of North Sulawesi (Rantung was told of this designation not by Lt. Gen. Supardjo 
Rustam, the Minister of the Interior, but by Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono, Murdani's 
A ssistan t for Social and Political Affairs); 21 Governor of Jakarta Lt. Gen. 
Suprapto's public admission that new appointments of mayors for North and Central 
Jakarta were being held up "pending the decision of the ABRI Commander"; 22 
and the overriding of the Riau Provincial Assembly's majority support of a 
civilian candidate (Ismail Suko) for Governor in favor of the incumbent, long­
time Murdani favorite Maj. Gen. Imam Munandar. 23 a different sort of concern 
has repeatedly been expressed by Army Chief of Staff Rudini over the past 
two years. This officer, who avoids Murdani's peremptory style, has over 
and over again tried to reassure his subordinates that their futures are safe 
and that no one will end up unemployed. 24 After all, he has been saying, 1892034
18. In an interview given in mid-December 1984 to Ian MacDowell, Reuters' 
chief Asia news coordinator, together with Jakarta bureau correspondents Richard 
Pascoe and Peter Millership, Murdani spoke about the future of dwifungsi as 
follows: "Whether this will be carried on by the next generation is a big 
question mark. . . . Whether they would want to apply a system which they 
feel is better . . . 20-25 years from now is anybody’s guess." See Indonesia 
Reports 3 (January 1985): 37.
19. His speech was billed in Angkatan Bersenjata, September 5, 1985, as being 
entitled "Dwifungsi ABRI tak mungkin dan tak akan ditinggalkan [ABRI's Dual 
Function Cannot and Will Not be Abandoned]."
20. On Nugroho, see Indonesia Reports 2 (December 1984): 34.
21. On the Rantung appointment and its background, see Sinar Harapan, February 
24, 1985, as cited in Indonesia Reports 5 (March 1985): 50; and Tempo, March 9, 
1985.
22. See Indonesia Reports 3 (January 1985): 12.
23. For a sardonic account of how Murdani's skenario for Riau came temporarily 
unstuck, and of the Commander-in-Chief's public anger, see the cover story 
in Tempo, September 14, 1985.
24. Angkatan Bersenjata, February 2, 1984, quoted Rudini as warning against 
"rumormongers" trying to split the Army. He insisted that there was no tru th  
in reports that a 48-year age limit would be imposed for some grades of officer, 
or that the process of pensioning officers off would be accelerated. In a long 
interview recorded in Tempo, May 11, 1985, Rudini also had some interesting 
things to say about the future relationship between promotions and postings to
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the changes in progress represent a reorganization, not a "rationalization" 
of the  Armed Forces.25 267 His aversion to the term rasionalisasi underscores 
the m ilita ry ’s b itte r  experiences in the  "rationalizations" of 1948 (which 
largely precipitated the bloody Madiun Affair) and of the early 1950s (which 
became a prime fac to r in the  politico-m ilitary regional crisis of 1956-58). 
On each occasion, soldiers who believed they were being dumped from the Army 
reacted violently. Rudini’s assurances seem—so fa r~ to  have had their effect, 
but it is probably too soon to tell how deep dissatisfaction and anxiety really 
ru n .28 In any event, it is clear that the Army (and Navy and Air Force) are 
still heavily overofficered. 27
nonmilitary positions. Henceforth fewer officers would be appointed as provincial 
governors, department secretaries-general, bupati, etc. On the other hand, 
single-term assignments to "civilian" functions would be made a normal part of 
a successful officer's career. For example, an able officer might serve one 
term in a local provincial assembly (DPRD), and, if he did well, go on to become 
a Korem commander. Officers in civilian postings would receive the standard 
civilian salaries for these jobs, minus their continuing military pay.
These statements reflect the fact that for two decades the huge superfluity 
of army officers inherited from the Revolution and the military politics of the 
Sukarno era has been handled by the distribution of patronage in the civilian 
secto r. (The policy has also ensured full military control over the s ta te  
apparatus and the state-controlled sectors of the economy.) Once in civilian 
posts, officers of the G eneration of 1945 rarely returned to  the strictly 
m ilitary  hierarchy. The rather small numbers of officers produced by the 
AMN in the 1960s has meant that the "internal" reasons for giving officers 
civilian jobs no longer exist. Yet if the doctrine of dwifungsi is to remain 
viable, civilian postings must be firmly integrated into the normal military 
career pattern. See Kaye's useful discussion in Far Eastern Economic Review, 
October 24, 1985, pp. 25-26.
25. Speaking to Commission I (Security) of the DPR in November 1984, Rudini 
explicitly  s ta te d  th a t the current reforms represented a reorganisasi, not 
a rasionalisasi. See Indonesia Reports 2 (December 1984): 47.
26. In June 1985, Justice Minister Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Ismail Saleh announced a 
plan, approved by Murdani, to hire up to 30,000 retired members of the Armed 
Forces as security guards at detentional and correctional facilities throughout 
Indonesia, with 10,000 "coming on board" at the first stage. Shortly thereafter, 
the Director-General of Corrections, Police Maj. Gen. Hudioro, said that the 
149 Lembaga Pemasyarakatan (correctional institutions) and 276 Rumah Tahanan 
(prisons) in Indonesia require about 29,000 guards (i.e., about 70 per institu­
tio n ). He added th a t  priority in recruiting would be given to retired or 
retiring senior NCOs and low-ranking officers. See Indonesia Reports 9 (July 
1985): 23 and 31, citing Kompas, June 9, and Berita Yudha, June 12, 1985. 
These figures give a sharp impression of the scale of the impending unemployment 
problem in the military and of the quantity of official places of detention 
in Indonesia.
27. In a parliamentary hearing in November 1984, Rudini told the legislators 
th a t th e  proper ratio between officers, NCOs (mainly master-sergeants and 
sergeants), and men (corporals and privates) in a modern army is 1:3:5. At 
present the Indonesian Army has a 1:1.37:3 ratio, but the reorganization should 
ensure an improvement to the level of 1:2.62:3.74—still very officer-heavy. 
See Indonesia Reports 2 (December 1984): 47.
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If we now turn from the implications of the new bureaucratic and command 
structures to those of the related personnel changes, the main developments 
seem to have been as follows:
As a group, the new powerholders are men born between 1934 and 1938, i.e., 
should expect to retire  between 1990 and 1994. The proportion of ethnic Javanese, 
now close to 80 percent, represents a marked increase over our last listing. 
The old divisional affiliations that were so important to the Army politics of 
the 1950-1980 period have virtually lost all meaning. The crucial "connections" 
now are to the RPKAD (especially during its heyday as the spearhead of the 
anti-Communist campaign of 1965-66) and to the coterie of men responsible for 
handling the East Timor "problem" from 1975 to 1985. And although in sheer 
numbers the graduates of Class 1 (I960) of the Military Academy now predominate, 
the really key players continue to be Murdani's classmates in the P3AD of the 
1950s:28 Maj. Gen. Sutaryo is Murdani’s Assistant for Intelligence; Maj. Gen. 
Dading Kalbuadi is his Assistant for Logistics; Maj. Gen. Soetarto is commander 
of Kodam 9 (i.e., East Timor); and Maj. Gen. Soeweno is commander of Kostrad.28 
Maj. Gen. C. I. Santoso's transfer from Assistant for Functional Group (Karyawan) 
Affairs in Mabes ABRI to Secretary-General of the Department of Transmigration 
should be read as Murdani’s move to take full control of the explosive mass- 
transmigration program in West Irian, which has caused major problems not 
only for the Irianese—11,000 of whom have fled over the border in the past 
18 months—but for the Indonesian government in its diplomatic relations with 
Papua-New Guinea and its public relations with the international press. Santoso 
served as Kodam commander in Irian between 1978 and 1982, and is intimately 
acquainted with the region. But P3AD control cannot continue for very long, 
since Murdani is the youngest member of the group and his own retirem ent from 
active service is due in the fall of 1988.
The most interesting individual personnel changes have taken place in the 
politically sensitive capital city, and appear to be related to the "succession" 
issue, both within the Army and Armed Forces, and at the national level. For 
some time most observers had been predicting that the first postrevolutionary 
officer to become Army Chief of Staff would be Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno. Graduating 
in 1959 from the Army Technical Academy (Aktekad) in the last class before 
that institution was merged into the newly established AMN in Magelang, he 
appeared an ideal candidate from both the military and political points of 
view. He had been Chief of Staff of Kodam XVI under Soeweno and Dading Kalbuadi 
in the years 1977-78, during the major antipopulation campaigns in East Timor 
th a t resu lted  in the loss, by firearms, starvation, and related disease, of 
at least a hundred thousand lives.38 Thereafter he had four successful years 28930
28. An a rtic le  in Angkatan Bersenjata of June 28, 1985 claimed that only 
th re e  tru e  ’45-ers were left in the Army—Rudini, Triantoro, and Soelarso; 
only one in the Navy—Romly; and one in the Air Force, Air Force Chief of 
Staff Sukardi, who entered the Air Force in 1953, but had served in the TRIP 
[Student Army] during the Revolution. The article went on to note, however, 
that the staf dekat (intimate staff) of Murdani continues to be mainly ’45-ers.
29. A big loss to this group has been caused by the recent death of Lt. Gen. 
Gunawan Wibisono, ex-Chief of the Social and Political Affairs Staff in Mabes 
ABRI.
30. In a recent interview with a correspondent from Asiaweek, East Timor 
Governor Mario Carrascalao estimated the death toll a t 100,000. See Asiaweek,
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as commander of Kodam IV in South Sumatra before moving up to become commander 
of the metropolitan command in 1982. On the political side, he had served 
as adjutant to Suharto in the middle seventies and seemed a personal favorite 
with the President. In the Jakarta command he had been considerably more 
popular than his predecessor, Norman Sasono, and had made conspicuous efforts 
to be on good terms with the city’s large pious Muslim population. 3<i Another, 
perhaps ambiguous, advantage was that though more or less the same age as 
the first AMN graduates, he was not among their number and thus was not regarded 
as representing or leading a cohesive military clique. His last year as commander 
in Jakarta, however, was more or less a disaster, beginning with the bloody 
Tanjung Priok affair in September 1984 in which dozens of people were killed 
by troops nominally under his authority ,31 2 34 followed by the bomb attacks on 
branches of Liem Sioe Liong’s Bank Central Asia, the devastating explosion 
at the Marines’ arsenal in Cilandak, and a series of spectacular (and suspicious) 
f ires  in major b u ild ings.32 (He also experienced difficulties with his own 
troops.) 34 Commanders in other regions where far less serious disturbances 
have taken place have typically been punished (after a face-saving interval) 
by being sent into military oblivion: for example, Maj. Gen. Sukotjo, commander 
in Central Java at the time of the widespread anti-Chinese riots in late  November 
1980, was dismissed on January 27, 1981. Because of these disasters, and 
persistent rumors that Murdani was displeased with his overall performance 
(especially  his cu ltiv atio n  of Islamic groups), there was some reason this 
spring to think that he might after all not become Chief of Staff. But presi­
dential favor seems to have stood him in good stead and he has succeeded Triantoro 
as Deputy Chief of Staff. Since Rudini, the Breda group’s one holder of the 
Chief of Staffship, is scheduled for retirem ent in December 1985, it is now 
more or less certain that Try Sutrisno will shortly "make the grade."
The interesting question, however, is how much the Chief of Staffship now 
means. Rudini has served capably but apolitically. His predecessor Poniman
August 2, 1985. Less interested parties tend to put the figure at from two 
to three times this figure.
31. See the rather effusive profile of him in Tempo, October 27, 1984.
32. In the course of his interview with Reuters’ correspondents cited above at 
note 18, Murdani appeared inadvertently to concede his personal direction of the 
crushing of these riots. He told Peter Millership that: "If [Priok] was not 
an isolated incident, would I not have been lynched in the pesantrens that I 
visited just two or three weeks ago?" Indonesia Reports 3 (January 1985): 30.
33. The chronology is: September 12, 1984, the Tanjung Priok riots; October 4, 
bombing of two BCA branches; October 17, burning down of the big PT Supermi 
factory; October 22, burning of the Sarinah Jaya shopping complex; October 29, 
explosion of the Cilandak arsenal; November 11, a large fire in the Kartika 
Plaza Hotel; November 13, gutting of the Sarinah Department Store; February 12, 
1985, burning down of an army depot and warehouses in North Jakarta; July 10, 
gutting of the nine-story Metro Building; and July 21, burning of the eight- 
story RRI (State Radio and Television) headquarters. In addition, numerous 
smaller factories, restaurants, theaters, and nightclubs have been consumed by 
mysterious flames.
34. Try Sutrisno himself noted that between 1983 and 1984 the numbers of 
disciplinary violations by members of the Jakarta Garrison had risen from 
77 to 187. See Indonesia Reports 4 (February 1985): 31.
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(the present Minister of Defense) was a mainstream administrator. One has 
to go back to the tenure of General Widodo in the late  1970s to recall a Chief 
of Staff who exercised visible independent authority. Moreover, since 1983, 
power in the military has been so centralized and concentrated in the hands 
of the Commander-in-Chief (who is a commander, not a staff  officer, after all) 
that one could argue that the officers who have real muscle are those who work 
in Murdani's immediate entourage. Seen from this angle of vision, AMN Class 
of 1960 "stars" like Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat and Maj. Gen. Soegiarto—who are 
younger than Try Sutrisno, but are now Murdani's Assistants for Operations 
and Personnel—may actually be as influential as the Army Chief of Staff.
It is in this context that certain developments have occurred which suggest 
the possibility of a degree of conflict between the political interests of the 
President and those of the Commander-in-Chief. What are these developments? 
The first is one to which I have already alluded, namely that Suharto has much 
to gain by Try Sutrisno's rise towards the Army Chief of Staffship, but Murdani 
very little . As we have seen, Murdani has been speaking in a way that suggests 
he wants to voice the group interests of the Military Academy graduates; fur­
thermore, he has been talking emphatically about the need to lessen dependence 
on foreign sources for weapons and weapons systems by developing a local munitions 
industry—remarks which not only are likely to appeal to the AMN men and to 
nationalist sentiment in general, but also imply a criticism of thirty years 
of army dependence on the US for weapons, training, logistical support, and 
so on .35
The second is the very curious choice of Lt. Gen. Triantoro as Gunawan 
Wibisono's successor in the important position of chief of Murdani's Social 
and Political Affairs staff. Triantoro is universally regarded as a competent 
but undistinguished functionary who will in any case have to re tire  next year 
and is thus an interim appointment. One could argue that if Try Sutrisno 
was to be moved up into Triantoro’s Deputy Chief of Staff position, something 
prestigious had to be found for Triantoro. But the obvious place for an officer 
of his stripe is a high post in the Ministry of Defense. That Murdani has 
taken him on as his political right hand man, rather than promoting a trusted 
crony like Sutaryo or Dading Kalbuadi, may suggest an intervention from the 
palace, or an intervention by anti-Murdani groups in the immediate presidential 
entourage.
The third development is the unusual choice of Maj. Gen. Sugito as Try 
Sutrisno's successor as commander of Kodam 10 in Jakarta, and the decision 
not to permit him to follow Try Sutrisno's precedent of doubling as Chief 
of Staff of the Metropolitan Garrison Command (Jakarta's equivalent to the 
nine KMK). Sugito's elevation has not come about through normal channels, 
i.e., through previous appointment to less important peripheral Kodam. Try 
Sutrisno had earlier been commander of Kodam IV. All his predecessors had 
followed comparable routes; Norman Sasono was ex-commander of Kodam XII, Mantik 
of Kodam IX, Poniman of Kodam XV, Makmun Murod of Kodam IV, and Amir Machmud 
of Kodam X. Sugito has come in direct from doubling as Commander of Kostrad's 
Airborne Combat Command and Commander of the Operations Security Command in
35. In 1984, a S trategic  Industries Council was set up to ensure that in 
the future the Armed Forces depend as little  as possible on foreign equipment. 
This council is headed by Minister for Research and Technology B. J. Habibie. 
For details, see the Murdani interview printed in the June issue of Swasembada, 
as cited in Indonesia Reports 10 (August 1985): 12.
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East Timor, 36 indeed he told the press that he was informed of his new appointment 
only two weeks before it was announced publicly, and felt sad to be leaving 
his "boys" and the people of East Timor in the midst of accomplishing an important 
pacification and "hearts and minds" campaign there. As usual, the military’s 
public relations machinery has been publicizing Sugito as yet another "simple," 
"democratic," "popular," "ready-to-listen" senior officer, but Tempo, probably 
co rrectly , quotes fellow officers as referring to him as orang tempur ("a 
rea l fighter").36 7 389 Not only has Murdani controlled operations in East Timor 
from the sta rt, but Sugito’s Timor service coincides with the very hard-line 
stand taken there since 1983, following the recall of the moderate commander 
of Korem 164 (East Timor), Col. Purwanto. 38 prior to that, Sugito had served 
for four years as Defense Attache in Hanoi, whose leaders Murdani has been 
so conspicuously cultivating that he has severely embarrassed Foreign Minister 
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. This history suggests that Sugito is a tough personal 
protege of Murdani, rather than a palace favorite; thus his appointment may 
be a sort of "equalizer" for the palace’s elevation of Try Sutrisno. At the 
same time, Sugito’s failure to double as Chief of Staff of the Jakarta Garrison 
quite possibly represents palace countermeasures. 39
Fourth is the transfer of Kopassus/Kopassandha commander Brig. Gen. Wismoyo 
Aris Munandar to serve as Soetarto's Chief of Staff in Kodam 9. On the surface 
this represents a promotion, since service in East Timor is highly coveted 
in the officer corps, and since there is every chance that Wismoyo will eventually 
succeed S o etarto . Yet i t  is s trik in g  that, at his inauguration, Soetarto
36. See the biographical sketch in Sinar Harapan, August 7 and 9, 1985. There 
is something puzzling about Sugito's being referred to as being in charge of 
Komando Operasi Keamanan, since "Operasi Keamanan" was the code name for the 
major ABRI offensive of April-September 1981. This code name was presumably 
made obsolete with the launching, in August 1983, of "Operasi Sapu Bersih 
[Operation Clean Sweep]."
37. Tempo, August 17, 1985.
38. Some background may be useful here. Korem 164/Wira Dharma (East Timor) 
was officially set up on March 26, 1979, with Col. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk 
as its first commander. Rajagukguk was a real hard-liner, and gained international 
notoriety when Amnesty International published secret documents he had signed 
authorizing the use of torture against people suspected of Fretilin connections. 
These documents were dated July 1982, and it is likely that Rajagukguk was 
withdrawn soon afterwards. In any case, in the last months of Gen. Andi Mohammad 
Yusuf’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief, and probably in accordance with Yusuf’s 
relatively "soft," "hearts and minds" approach to counterinsurgency, the moderate 
Col. Purwanto was sent out to be Korem 161's second commander. Secret negotiations 
were begun between Purwanto and the Fretilin guerrilla leader, Kay Rala Xanana, 
which resulted in a ceasefire in March 1983, just as Murdani was replacing 
Yusuf as Commander-in-Chief. The ceasefire lasted until early August, when 
a Fretilin band reportedly ambushed and killed some unarmed military personnel. 
Murdani took the opportunity to launch a large-scale offensive ("Operation 
Security"), and Purwanto was replaced by the hard-line Col. Rudito. Rudito 
died of cancer in a Dutch hospital in mid-January 1985. See Tempo, February 9, 
1985. His replacement, Col. Rahardjo, is said to be more moderate.
39. See Angkatan Bersenjata, August 9, 1985. Control of the garrison has 
passed, since August 21, 1985, into the hands of Col. K. Harsono, AMN Class 2 
(1961), previously Inspector for Security (Intelligence) in Army Headquarters.
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went out of his way to inform the public that the transfer was really  a promotion, 
and not a demotion. *o Why? It is widely rumored that Wismoyo, who is married 
to a younger sister of Mrs. Suharto, and is thus a brother-in-law of a President 
who is famous for being nice to his relatives, consistently reported directly 
to the President via Mrs. Suharto during his tenure as Kopassandha commander,
i.e ., deliberately did not follow the military chain of command up through 
Murdani. His removal to a staff job in Kodam 9 is therefore likely to  have 
been agreeable  to  Murdani. Furthermore, his successor, Brig. Gen. Sintong 
Pandjaitan, looks to be very much a Murdani figure. Aside from a combat role 
in the  "countercoup" of October 1, 1965 (he participated in the recapture 
of the RRI installations from September 30 Movement troops), he was in operational 
command of the spectacular Operation Woyla on March 31, 1981, when paratroopers 
under Murdani's overall direction recaptured a Garuda airliner hijacked by 
"Muslim extremists" at Bangkok’s Don Muang airport. *1
Finally, it is perhaps worth drawing attention to the recent changing of 
the guard in the new Tjakrabirawa—the Presidential Security Force, Paswalpres. 
The fo rce’s long-tim e commander (since 1978), Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono, has 
gone to Mabes ABRI to become head of the combined services’ military police. 42 
His successor, Col. Pranowo, was previously head of the military police in 
Kodam V/Jaya. It is possible that Pranowo represents an ally of his old commander, 
Try Sutrisno; but it is just as possible that he is an ally of the former 
Chief of Staff of Kodam V, Eddy Nalapraya, one of Indonesia's most capable 
intelligence specialists and long regarded as Murdani’s "eyes and ears" within 
the metropolitan military command.
Obviously, the observations above are speculative in character. In any 
given instance, they may be completely mistaken. But it is unlikely that 
they all are. At the very least one could suggest that a certain hypothesis 
needs confirmation or refuting. In a nutshell this hypothesis is: Try Sutrisno's 
elevation, Triantoro’s new appointment, and the division of power in the Jakarta 
command represent palace interests; while the appointment of Sugito, the transfer 
of Wismoyo, and possibly the replacement of Sardjono by Pranowo, express the 
interests of Murdani and his entourage. In any case, the next appointments 
to watch are the selections of successors to Rudini and Triantoro.
* * *
40. Indonesia Reports 9 (July 1985): 48, citing Suara Karya, June 24, 1985.
41. A brief biographical sketch of Pandjaitan appears in Angkatan Bersenjata, 
May 23, 1985.
42. I t  is in te re s tin g  th a t  since Sardjono’s transfer a series of important 
changes in the functions and powers of the military police have been announced. 
From now on the Navy and Air Force will not have their own police, but will 
be serviced by a unified Corps Polisi Militer under the control of the Armed 
Forces' Military Police Center (Puspom ABRI). On the other hand, this agency 
has yielded its authority over military prisons to the Armed Forces' Legal 
Upbuilding Body (Babinkum ABRI), and, more significantly, its responsibility 
for what is termed pembinaan teknis pengamanan (roughly "technical management 
of security") for the  P resident and Vice President and their families, to 
the Army Chief of Staff. In other words, control will lie with Rudini, and 
probably, in due course, with presidential favorite Try Sutrisno. See Angkatan 
Bersenjata, June 18, 1985.
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The list approximates the format used in earlier issues of Indonesia and 
is for the period ending September 30, 1985. Those officers whose careers 
have already been detailed in Indonesia, issues 36 and 37 (October 1983 and 
April 1984), and for whom no substantial new information has been forthcoming, 
have their names marked with an asterisk. Those in emphasized type are new 
office holders, or those old-timers for whom new information has come available; 
they and their "biographies" are listed in alphabetical order a t the end of 
this compilation, followed by a brief glossary of some of the most used abbre­
viations.
ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS (Mabes ABRI)
I. Commander-in-Chief
Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces 
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") 28.III.83 (30 months)
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Murdani*
(b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) (P3AD)
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf 
Assistant for Security, Hankam; Head, 
S tr a te g ic  I n te l l ig e n c e  C enter; 
Deputy Head, Bakin 
RPKAD J
Commander of Kopkamtib 
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani 29.111.83 (30 months)




Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)
1. Lt. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto* 
(b. September 14, 1929, Magetan) 
(AMN Yogya I, 1948)
c. February 1983 -  c. 10.XI.84 (c. 20 
months)
Vice-Adm. Mohammad Romly 
Commander, Kowilhan III 
SI J
2. Vice-Marshal Oetomo c. 10.XI.84 (10% months)
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Air Force J
Chief of the Social and Political Staff (Kassospol)
1. Lt. Gen. M. Kharis Suhud* 11.IX.78 -  25.11.84 (64*5 months)
2. Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono1
(b. November 1, 1931, Rembang) 
(P3AD)
3. Lt. Gen. Triantoro*
(b. January 7, 1931, Surabaya)
Gen. Darjatmo 
Ambassador to Bangkok 
SI J
25.11.84 - 27.VI.85 (16 months) 
Inspector-General, Mabes ABRI 
RPKAD J
21.VIII.85 (1 month)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff 
Ordnance J
Inspector-General (Irjen ABRI)
1. Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono ? (1983) -  c. March 1984 (?)
?
Inspector-General of the Army 
RPKAD J
1. Gunawan died suddenly in Houston on June 27, 1985 while under treatm ent 
for heart disease.
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2. First Marshal Iskandar e. March 1984 (18 months)
9
Air Force J
Assistant for Security [Intelligence] (Aspam)
Maj. Gen. M. I. Sutaryo 
(P3AD)
Assistant for Operations (Asops) 
1. Lt. Gen. M. Sanif*
2. First Marshal Ibnu Subroto
3. Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat* 
(b. c. 1938) (AMN 1, 1960)
9
Gen. L. B. Murdani
9
? J
?.VII.81 - c. November 1984 (c. 40
months)
Maj. Gen. Seno Hartono 
Commander, Kodam II 
SI J




c. 30.IV.85 (5 months)
Commander, Kodam VI (3)
SI J
Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)
1. Maj. Gen. Eddy Marzuki Nalapraya 
(b. 1930) 2
2. Maj. Gen. Sarwono 
(Breda?)
c. 30.V.83 - c. November 1984 (c. 17 
months)
Maj. Gen. Naya Iskandar Sumantri
Chief of Staff, Kodam V
Kodam V Jakartan
c. November 1984 (c. 11 months)
9
SI? J
Assistant for Communications and Electronics (Askomlek)
1. Vice-Marshal Ted jo Suwarno
2. First Marshal Soebagyo
27.VII.78 - c. November 1984 (c. 75 
months)
Maj. Gen. Drs. Suryadi 
Deputy Assistant for Communications 
and Electronics 
Air Force J




Assistant for Security and Social Order (Askamtibmas)
1. Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Poerwata ?.83 -  c. 20.VII.85 (?)
Police Maj. Gen. Issukandar 
Police ?
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2. Police Maj. Gen. Achmad Djuaeni
Assistant for Personnel (Aspers)
1. Maj. Gen. Suharto Partoatmodjoa 
(b. c. 1927, Kediri)
2. Maj. Gen. Soegiarto
(b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar, 
Kebumen) (AMN 1, 1960)
Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)
Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi*
(b. April 14, 1931, Cilacap) 
(P3AD)
Assistant for Finance (Asku) 
Lt. Gen. Widyo Sarwono*2 3 4
c. 20.VII.85 (2*5 months)
Chief of Police, North Sumatra 
Police J?
? -  c. April 1985
Lt. Gen. Soekemi Soemantri
9
? J
c. 30.IV.85 (5 months) 
Commander, Kodam VII (4)
D J
c. February 1983 (c. 31 months) 
Lt. Gen. Supardjo 
Commander, Kodam XVI 
RPKAD J
6.IX.75 (? 120 months)
Maj. Gen. Suhanto
Officer seconded to the Army Chief of 
Staff
Finance Corps J
Assistant for Social and Political Affairs (Assospol)
Maj. Gen. Goenarso S.F.* 4.III.80 (67 months)
Brig. Gen. Prapto Prajitno
Head, Armed Forces' Information Center
B J
Assistant for Functional Group Affairs 4 (Askar)
1. Maj. Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso* 
(b. c. 1930-31) (P3AD)
2. Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa 
(b. July 20, 1933, Bandung)
(Akad Zeni 1956)
30.V.83 - c. 9.VIII.85 (26 months)
9
Commander, Kodam XVII 
RPKAD J
c. 9.VIII.85 (2 months) 
Commander, Kodam 2 
Engineers S
2. In March, the retirem ent from active service and the subsequent appointment 
as ambassador to Rangoon and Katmandu of Maj. Gen. Soeharto was announced. 
But it is not clear when exactly he relinquished this post.
3. There is some reason to think that Widyo Sarwono may have retired, but 
there is as yet no information on his successor.
4. On July 31, 1985 Santoso took up a new position as Secretary-General of 
the Department of Transmigration (overseeing the huge planned transmigrations 
to West Irian).
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Head, Armed Forces' Financial Centers
Col. Rachmansyah c. 23.III.85 (6 months)
9
Finance Corps J?
Central Executive Organs (Lakpus)
1. Governor, National Defense Institute (Lemhannas)
Maj. Gen. Soebijakto* 31.V.83 (28 months)
(b. August 17, 1929, Wates) Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono
(Breda) Officer seconded to the Commander-
in-Chief
B J
2 Commander-General, Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri)
1. Lt. Gen. Murgito* 7.VI.83 -  21.11.85 (20 months)
(b. January 18, 1928) (P3AD) Lt. Gen. Julius Henuhili
Commander, Kodam VIII 
B J
2. Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi 21.11.85 (7 months)
Suriadiredja* Commander, Kowilhan IV
(b. June 14, 1931, Bandung) Marines S
3. Commander-General, Armed Forces’ Staff and Command School (Sesko ABRI)
1. Vice-Marshal Aried Riyadi*5 6 16.V.83 - 23.VI.84 (13 months)
Vice-Admiral Prasodjo Mahdi 
Commander, Combined Air Strike Com­
mand (Kopatdara)
Air Force ?
2. Maj. Gen. Drs. Sumargono K. 23.VI.84 (15 months)
9
? J
4. Head, Armed Forces’ Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal)
First Admiral Dr. Tarmizi Taher ?
Brig. Gen. M. Soegeng Widjaja
9
Navy J
5. Head, Research and Development Center (Puslitbang)
1. Maj. Gen. Theo Sumantri* ?.11.83 -  ?
(Breda) Maj. Gen. Otty Soekotjo
Head, Army Data Collection and Pro­
cessing Center 
Signal Corps J
5. The heads of two other bodies functioning directly under the Commander-in- 
Chief—the Strategic Policy and Planning Staff (Srenum) and the Armed Forces' 
Strategic Intelligence Body (Bais)--have yet to be announced to the public.
6. Aried Riyadi's retirem ent was announced in November 1984.
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2. Brig. Gen. Dr. Ngandani M.Se. 9
9
9 J
6. Head, Armed Forces’ Historical Center (Pusjarah)
Brig. Gen. Gatot Surjadi ? 1982 (c. 3 years)
Brig. Gen. (Titular) Dr. Nugroho Noto- 
susanto
7. Head, Armed Forces’ Medical Center 
Maj. Gen. Dr. Kurnia Natadisastra
8. Head, Armed Forces’ Military Police
1. Brig. Gen. Gatot Matrai?




c. 2.VI.79 (76 months)








c. late  February 85 (7 months)
H ead, P re s id e n t’s Security Squad 
(Paswalpres)
CPM J
9. Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center (Puspen)
First Admiral Emir H. Mangaweang 17.VI.83 (27% months)
Brig. Gen. Drs. Encung A.S.
9
? ?
10. Head, Armed Forces' Survey and Mapping Center
Brig. Gen. Utaryo Surodirono 8.XI.83 (23 months)
Vice-Admiral D. U. Martojo
9
Topography Corps J
11. Head, Armed Forces’ Legal Upbuilding Body (Babinkum)




12. Head, Armed Forces’ Supply Body (Babek)
Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi* 
(b. April 14, 1931, Cilacap) 
(P3AD)
c. March 1983 (c. 30 months) 
Maj. Gen. M. R. Sunardjo 
Commander, Kodam XVI 
RPKAD J
7. Gatot Matrai’s retirem ent was also announced in November 1984, but he 
may have stayed on temporarily until Sardjono assumed the position.
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13 Head, Armed Forces* Functional Group Upbuilding Body (Babinkar)
1. Maj. Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso* 29.V.83 -  c. 15.VII.85 (25 months) 
(P3AD) Maj. Gen. Widodo Mulatto
Commander, Kodam XVII 
RPKAD J
2. Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa* e. 15.VII.85 (2*s months)
(b. July 20, 1933, Bandung) Commander, Kodam IV (2)
(Akad Zeni 1956) Engineers S
14. Commander, National Strategic Command (Kostranas) 8
First Marshal Roesman# c. January 1983 -  16.VII.85 (30 months)
(b. c. 1933, Karanganyar, Air Vice-Marshal Sukardi
Kebumen) Chief of Staff, Kostranas
Air Force J
15. Commander, National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas)
1. Vice-Marshal Iskandar*
2. First Marshal Hartono
9.X.78 -  c. 8.VIII.84 (c. 70 months)
Air Vice-Marshal Suwondo 
Governor, Air Force Division, Armed 
Forces' Academy 
Air Force J
c. 8.VIII.84 (14 months)
9
Air Force J
SERVICE HEADS AND ARMY HIERARCHY
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") 
Murdani*
(b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) (P3AD)
Army Chief of Staff 
Gen. Rudini*
(b. December 15, 1929, Malang) 
(Breda)
Navy Chief of Staff
Admiral Mohammad Romly*
(b. December 8, 1928, 
(Tulungagung)
28.III.83 (30 months)
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf 
A s s is ta n t  fo r S ecu rity , D ept, of 
Defense and Security; Head, S trate­




Gen. S. Poniman 
Commander, K os trad 
D J
4 .XII.82 (34 months)
Admiral Walujo Sugito 
C hief of Operations Staff, Dept, of 
Defense and Security 
Navy J
8. Kostranas was formally liquidated on July 16, 1985
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Air Force Chief of Staff
Air Marshal Sukardi*
(b. December 1931, Bojonegoro)
Chief of the National Police
Police General Anton Sudjarwo*
(b. September 21, 1930, Bandung) 
(Brimob)
Commander of the Marine Corps (KKo)
Brig. Gen. (Marines) Muntaram*
(b. c. 1934-35, Cianjur)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
1. Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro* 
(b. January 7, 1931, Surabaya)
2. Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno*
(b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya) 
(Aktekad 4, 1959)
First Assistant (Intelligence)
1. Maj. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko*
2. Brig. Gen. I Gde Awet Sara* 
(b. March 3, 1936, Bali) 
(Aktekad 4, 1959)
Second Assistant (Operations)
1. Maj. Gen. Prajitno*
(Breda?)
2. Brig. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk 
(b. December 31, 1938, Medan)
(AMN 2, 1961)
Third Assistant (Personnel)
1. Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh*
(b. June 5, 1928, Yogya) (Breda)
4.XII.82 (34 months)
Air Marshal Ashadi Tjahjadi 
Commander, Kostranas 
Air Force J
4 .XII.82 (34 months)
Police Lt. Gen. Dr. Awaloeddin D jam in 
Chief of Police, Jakarta  
Police J
7.V.83 (29 months)
Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja 
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps 
Marines S
28.V.83 - 21.VIII.85 (27 months)
Commander-General, Army Research, 
Development and Training Command 
Ordnance J
21.VIII.85 (1 month)
Commander, Kodam V (10)
Engineers J
23.V.83 -  26.VI.85 (25 months)
Maj. Gen. Soelarso 
Commander, Kodam IV (2) 
Engineers/B J
26.VI.85 (3 months)
Commander, Kodam IX 
Engineers Balinese





Commander, Kodam XIII 
D Toba Batak
23.V.83 - 26.VI.85 (25 months)
Maj. Gen. Soeharto
Governor, General and Army Division, 
Armed Forces' Academy 
B J
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2. Brig. Gen. Syaukat Banjaransari
(b. e. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960)
Fourth Assistant (Logistics)
Maj. Gen. Ishak Odang*
26.VI.85 (3 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad 
? J
23.V.83 (28 months)
Lt. Gen. Haroen Soewardi 
Head, Army General Supply Service 
? S?
Fifth Assistant (Research and Development)
1. Maj. Gen. Darsoyo*
(Breda)
2. Brig. Gen. Sukarto
(b. c. 1938) (AMN 1, 1960)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs
1. Brig. Gen. Harjono Prawirodirdjo* 9 
(b. 1929, Malang) (Breda)
2. Brig. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana 
(b. June 5, 1937, Bali)
(AMN 1, 1960)
23.V.83 -  26.VI.85 (25 months)
Lt. Gen. Supardjo
D eputy  A s sis ta n t fo r T e rr ito ria l 




Deputy Governor, General and Army 
Division, Armed Forces' Academy 
D J
23.V.83 - 2.1.84 (7 months)
Lt. Gen. Abdul Rivai Harahap 
Deputy Governor, General and Army 
Division, Armed Forces' Academy 
Cavalry/B J
9.X.84 (12 months)
Commander, Kodam XII 
? Balinese
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)
24.V.83 (28 months)
Lt. Gen. Rudini
Second A s s is ta n t (O perations) 
the Army Chief of Staff)
RPKAD J
Lt. Gen. Soeweno*
(b. c. 1929, Madiun) (P3AD)
to
Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces’ Academy 
Maj. Gen. Untung Sridadi c. 6.VI.83 (28 months)
Tjokrowidjojo* 
(Breda)
Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh 
Army Inspector-General 
D J
9. Harjono died suddenly on January 2, 1984. It is not clear who filled in 
between that date and Sudjana’s inauguration, but probably it was Harjono’s 
deputy.
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Commander, Army Staff and Command School 10
1. Maj. Gen. Bagus Sumitro* 
(AMN Yogya II, 1949)
27.IV.81 - ?.83 (?)
Maj. Gen. Bambang Triantoro 
Commander, Kodam XV 
B J
2. Maj. Gen. Theo Sumantri 
(Breda)
?.83 (?)
Head, Research and Development Center, 
Armed Forces’ Headquarters 
Signal Corps J
Commander-General, Army Logistics Command'll
Maj. Gen. Yoes Adipoernomo 26.IX.77 - ?. 11.83 (64 months)
(AMN Yogya II, 1949) Maj. Gen. Amir Judowinarno
Deputy Commander-General, Army Logis­
tics Command
Quartermaster Corps J
Commander-General, Army Research, Development and Training Command
Maj. Gen. Sebastian Soekoso* 
(P3AD)
Commander, Kopassus [Kopassandha] 12
1. Brig. Gen. Wismoyo Aris Munandar* 
(b. February 2, 1940)
(AMN 4, 1963)
2. Brig. Gen. Sintong Pandjaitan 
(b. September 4, 1941, Tarutung) 
(AMN 4, 1963)
25.V.83 (28 months)
Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro 
Commander, Kodam XV 
RPKAD J
6.IV.83 -  22.V.85 (25% months)
Lt. Gen. R. Yog;ie Suwardi Memet 
Commander, Group I Kopassandha (Serang) 
RPKAD J
22.V.85 (4 months)
Commander, Airborne and Secret War 
Training Center [Pusandha Linud] of 
Kopassus
RPKAD Toba Batak
Commanders of Territorial Commands (Kodam)
1. Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra) 13
Maj. Gen. Suripto* 27.IV.85 (5 months)
(b. February 18, 1934) ------
(AMN 1, 1960) Commander, Kodam III
D J
10. Bagus Sumitro retired in 1983 and must have been replaced shortly thereafter.
11. Since Yoes Adipoernomo retired in 1983, no announcement has been made 
about his successor.
12. In the spring of 1985, Kopassandha was reformed as Komando Pasukan Khusus 
(Kopassus), or Special Forces Command.
13. The new Kodam 1 was formed on April 27, 1985 from the merger of the former 
Kodam I—III, which were liquidated on April 25-26. Command was inherited by 
ex-Kodam III commander Suripto, while the former commanders of Kodam I (Nana
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2. Sriwijaya (South Sumatra)*!*
1. Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa* 
(b. July 20, 1933, Bandung)
(Akad Zeni 1956)
2. Maj. Gen. Siswadi
3. Siliwangi (West Java)i5
1. Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat* 
(b. c. 1938) (AMN 1, 1960)
2. Maj. Gen. Raja Inal Siregar 
(b. c. 1938) (AMN 2, 1961)
4. Diponegoro (Central Java)is
1. Maj. Gen. Soegiarto
(b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar, 
Kebumen) (AMN 1, 1960)
2. Maj. Gen. Harsudiyono Hartas
(b. June 4, 1935, Jepara)
(AMN 1, 1960)
5. Brawijaya (East Java) 17
1. Maj. Gen. Soelarso*
(Breda)
9.IV.85 - 23.V.85 (1*5 months)
Commander, Kodam IV 
Engineers S
23.V.85 (4 months)
Director, Social and Political Doctrine 
Development, Armed Forces’ Staff 
and Command College 
Engineers/D J
9.IV.85 - 18.V.85 (1 month)
Commander, Kodam VI 
RPKAD/B J
18.V.85 (4*5 months)
Commander, Kodam XIII 
? Sipirok Batak
9.IV.85 -  18.V.85 (1 month)
Commander, Kodam VII 
D J
18.V.85 (4*5 months) 
Commander, Kodam II 
Cavalry J
9.IV.85 - 14.V.85 (1 month)
Commander, Kodam VIII 
RPKAD/D J
Narundana) and II (Harsudiyono Hartas) became commanders of the new Kodam 
4 and 7.
14. When the former Kodam IV became the new Kodam 2 on April 9, 1985, its 
territory remained unchanged. Roestandi A. Moestafa, who had been commander 
of Kodam IV since May 9, 1983, stayed on just long enough to oversee the change 
in nomenclature.
15. When Kodam VI became Kodam 3 on April 9, 1985, its territory  remained 
the same. Edy Sudradjat, Kodam Vi’s commander since April 16, 1983, stayed 
on just long enough to handle the change.
16. When the former Kodam VII became the new Kodam 4 on April 9, 1985, its 
te rrito ry  remained unaltered. Soegiarto, who had commanded it since April 
7, 1983, stayed on briefly to oversee the change.
17. When the former Kodam VIII became the new Kodam 5, its territory  remained 
the same. Soelarso, its commander since May 19, 1983, stayed on for a short 
while to supervise the change.
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2. Maj. Gen. Salful Sulun
(b. January 6, 1937, Medan) 
(AMN 1, 1960)
6. Tanjungpura (Kalimantan) 18
Maj. Gen. Faisal Tanjung
(AMN 2, 1961)
14.V.85 (4% months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII (5)
Artillery Minangkabau
2.V.85 (5 months)
Commander, Infantry Weapons Center 
RPKAD J?
7. Wirabuana (Sulawesi) 19
Maj. Gen. Nana Narundana 47.V.85 (5 months)
(b. c. 1937, Tasikmalaya) ------
(AMN 1, 1960) Commander, Kodam I
Cavalry S
8. Cendrawasih (Irian Barat and Maluku)so





18. The new Kodam 6 was formally inaugurated on May 1, 1985, and represented 
a merger of Kodam IX, X, and XII, which were formally liquidated during the 
previous week. The new commander, Faisal Tanjung, had not previously held 
a major territorial command. Awet Sara, who had been commander of Kodam IX 
since May 5, 1983, was moved to become Assistant-1 (Intelligence) to the Army 
Chief of Staff. Syamsudin, commander of Kodam X since December 19, 1982, 
was transferred to become head of the reorganized Infantry Center (Pussif) 
in Bandung. In the case of Kodam XII, Ida Bagus Sudjana, who had been commander 
since December 30, 1982, replaced Harjono Prawirodirdjo (after the la tte r’s 
sudden death) as the Army Chief of Staff's Assistant for T erritorial Affairs. 
From October 11, 1984 till it was liquidated, this Kodam was commanded by 
the former Chief of Staff of Kodam X, Col. Pardjoko Suryokusumo. On the formation 
of the new Kodam 6, Pardjoko became its Chief of Staff.
19. The new Kodam 7 was formally inaugurated on May 4, 1985, and represented 
a merger of Kodam XIII and XIV, which were formally abolished a few days earlier. 
Rajagukguk, commander of Kodam XIII since May 30, 1983, moved up to become 
A ssistan t-2  (O perations) to  the  Army Chief of Staff. It is still unclear 
what new assignment has been given to Soetedjo, who commanded Kodam XIV from 
April 13, 1983 until its liquidation.
20. The new Kodam 8 was formally established on May 9, 1985, and represented 
a merger of Kodam XV and XVII, which were closed down shortly beforehand. 
Its first commander, Hasudungan Simandjuntak, had been commander of Kodam 
XV since May 17, 1983. Raja Kami Sembiring Meliala, commander of Kodam XVII 
since June 14, 1982, appears as yet to have received no new assignment of 
importance. It is instructive that the headquarters of the new Kodam is not, 
as one might expect, in Ambon, but in Jayapura, West Irian.
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9. Udayana (Nusatenggara)2i
Maj. Gen. R. P. D. Soetarto* 
(P3AD)
10. Jaya (Greater Jakarta) 22
1. Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno
(b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya) 
(Aktekad 4, 1959)
2. Maj. Gen. Sugito 
(b. c. 1939, Yogya) 
(AMN 2, 1961)
Head, State Intelligence Coordination
Gen. Yoga Sugama
(b. May 12, 1925, Tegal) 
(Rikugun Shikan Gakko 
[Japanese Military Academy])
9.IV.85 (6 months)
Commander, Kodam XVI 
SI J
9.IV.85 -  9.VIII.85 (4 months)
Commander, Kodam V 
Engineers J
9.VIII.85 (1H months)
Commander, Airborne Combat Command, 
Kostrad; Commander, Security Opera­




Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono 
Deputy Ambassador to the UN 
D J
Commander, Presidential Security Squad (Paswalpres)




2. Col. Pranowo 30.1.85 (8 months)
Commander, Military Police, Kodam V 
CPM J
21. Kodam 9, the new form of Kodam XVI, was inaugurated on April 9, 1985. 
Soetarto, Kodam XVI commander since May 18, 1983, has stayed on in spite of 
the change.
22. Kodam 10, a Kodam with a special status, was inaugurated on April 9, 
1985, as a reincarnation of Kodam V. Try Sutrisno, Kodam V commander since 
December 27, 1982, stayed on for four months after the transition, before 
being promoted to Deputy Army Chief of Staff. It is striking that whereas 
Try Sutrisno had concurrently held the post of Chief of Staff of the Metropolitan 
Command (Kas Garnizun), this job is now in the hands of Col. K. Harsono, AMN 





61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
84- ? Served in Kopassandha.
-85 Brig. Gen. Commander, Army Infantry Weapons Center.
85- Commander, Kodam 6.
Gunawan Wibisono











Graduated from P3AD with Murdani.
Paracommando training.
Rose in RPKAD.
Major. "Popular” figure on staff of RPKAD Commander Col. Sarwo 
Edhie Wibowo.
Lieut.-Col. Commander, Cadet Regiment, Akabri.
Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII.
Governor, General and Army Division, Akabri.
Commander-General, Seskogab.
Inspector-General, Department of Defense.
Chief of the Social and Political Staff, Mabes ABRI. Died June 27, 
1985.
Had taken part in operations against the Darul Islam, Malaysia (Dwikora), 
and the September 30th Movement, and had served in the Garuda VIII force 
to the Middle East in the last half of 1975.
Harsudiyono Hartas
b. June 4, 1935, Jepara.
57 Completed senior high school.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? -71 Major (C avalry). Deputy Commander, First Cavalry Battalion, 
Kostrad.
72 Attended Seskoad.
75 Attended Seskogab and went to New Zealand.
77-? Commander, First Cavalry Brigade, Kostrad.
78 Went to the US. Served on Army Chief of Staff’s personnel planning
staff.
81-83 Deputy Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces’ Academy.
83-85 Commander, Kodam II.
85 Went to S. Korea.
85- Commander, Kodam 4.
Speaks Sundanese, Javanese, and English fluently.
Nana Narundana
b. c. 1937, Tasikmalaya.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
68 Completed Suslapa.
70 Deputy Commander, Cavalry Battalion, Kodam VI.
71 Studied a t Seskoad.
74-75 Chief of Staff, Korem 012, Kodam II in Pematang Siantar.
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75-76 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam II.
77 Attended Seskogab.
78-80 Commander, Korem 022, Kodam II, in Padang Sidempuan.
81 Attended Lemhannas.
? Deputy Commander, Army Center for T erritorial Development, Bandung.
81?-83 Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII.
83-85 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam I.
85- Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 7.
Married to Andi Bunga, a Buginese aristocrat.
Pandjaitan, Sintong
b. September 4, 1941, Tarutung.
59 Came to Java after completing senior high school.
63 Graduated from AMN, Class 4.
65 As Second Lieutenant in the RPKAD, led attack to recapture RRI
building from the September 30th Movement.
81 Led the RPKAD/Kopassandha attack on the hijacked Garuda airplane
in Bangkok on March 31. Operation Woyla.
Pardjoko Suryokusumo 
b. c. 1939.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Attended Seskoad.
? Attended Seskogab.
? Attended National Defense College in the US.
83- 84 Colonel. Chief of Staff, Kodam X.
84- 85 Commander, Kodam XII (last commander).
85- Chief of Staff, Kodam 6.
Fluent in French, English, and German.
Rajagukguk, Adolf Sahala
b. December 31, 1939, Medan.
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
? Platoon Commander in Battalion 605, Kodam X.
? Company Commander in Battalion 604, Kodam XIII.
? Company Commander, Cadets’ Regiment, Akabri.
? Deputy Commander, Headquarters Detachment, Kodam XIII.
? Commander, Battalion 711, Kodam XIII.
? Taught at Seskoad.
? Commander, Brigade 6, Kodam VII and Kostrad.
? -82 Colonel. Commander, Korem 164/East Timor, Kodam XVI.
82- 83 Chief of Staff, Kodam XIII.
83- 84 Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam XIII.
84- 85 Deputy Commander, Army Staff and Command College.
85- Maj. Gen. Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.
Attended Army Staff College in England in 1972-735 has taken Kupaltu and 
Suslapa. Fluent in English, Batak, and Javanese.
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Saiful Sulun
b. January 6, 1937, Medan.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
62 Took Kudarlap (Basic Field Course); also took a course in Leningrad.
66 Graduated from civil high school. Chief of Staff, Field Artillery
Battalion/N anggala.
67 Took Advanced Officers’ Training Course, Cimahi.
68 Took commando course a t Batujajar.
74-77 Commander, Fourth Field Artillery Battalion; Deputy Assistant-1 
(Intelligence), Kodam X; Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam X.
74 Attended Seskoad.
75 Attended Seskogab.
? Took Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, Manila.
81 Attended Lemhannas (Class 14).
77- 81 Member of Parliament and the MPR.
81? O fficer seconded to  the Functional Affairs Staff, Ministry of
Defense and Security.
81-82 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kowilhan I.
83- 84 Colonel. Chief of Staff, Kodam IV.
84- 85 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII.
85- Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 5.
Married to Drs. Zulfikar Mahadi, a niece of Haji Agus Salim on her mother's 
side.
Simandjuntak, Hasudungan
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam V.
? Commander, Regimental Combat Team, East Timor.
? -83 Commander, Infantry Training Center (Pussenif).
83- 85 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam XV.
85- Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 8.
Siregar, Raja Inal 
b. March 5, 1938.
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
? Platoon commander in Battalion 603.
? Commander, Panzer Company, Third Infantry Battalion.
65-68 Assigned (intelligence work) to Central Java.
68- 69 Took Suslapa.
69- ? Assigned (intelligence work?) to Makasar.
72 Spent a year in the Philippines.
73- 74 Attended Seskoad.
74- 78 Deputy Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam II.
78- 81 A ssistan t-1  (In te llig en ce ), Kodam II. Active against Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka.
81- 82 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam VI.
82- 84 Chief of Staff, Kodam II.
84- 85 Commander, Kodam XIII.
85- Commander, Kodam 3.
Has excellent English thanks to year in Manila.
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Sudjana, Ida Bagus 
b. June 5, 1937.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
61-66 Second, then F irst Lieutenant. Training officer at the Field 
Artillery Training Center (Pusdik Armed).
67-? Captain. Deputy Commander, Ninth Field Artillery Battalion.
70 Major.
73 Lieut.-Col.
75- 77 Commander, Second Field Artillery Regiment, Kostrad.
78-81 Colonel. Commander, Korem 121, Sintang, West Kalimantan.
81 Top marks for w ritten work, regular course, Lemhannas.
81- 82 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
82- 84 Commander, Kodam XII.
84- Assistant for T erritorial Affairs to the Army Chief of Staff.
Has taken Suslapa Arhanud and attended Seskoad and Seskogab.
Soegeng Soebroto
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
83- 85 Chief of Staff, Kodam V (10).
85- Assistant-4 (Logistics) to the Army Chief of Staff.
Soegiarto
b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar, Kebumen.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
72-73 Commander, Battalion 401/Para, Kodam VII and Kostrad in Srondol.
76- 77 Commander, Cadets’ Regiment, Akabri.
77- 78 Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN Forces in the Middle East.
78- 79 Chief of Staff, Kodam III.
79- 83 Brig. Gen., then Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam XIV.
83-85 Commander, Kodam VII (4).
85- Assistant for Personnel, Mabes ABRI.
Has been through Advanced Officers’ Training Course-II; Seskoad; and Seskogab. 
Earned special promotion from Lieut.-Col. to Colonel for outstanding per­
formance in East Timor.
Sugito
b. February 15, 1938, Yogyakarta.
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
64 Joined RPKAD.
? -78 Rose from platoon commander to group commander in the Kopassandha 
[now Puspassus].
75 Reportedly first Kopassandha commander to make parachute landing
in East Timor.
78-82 Defense attache in Hanoi.
83 Attended Lemhannas.
83-85 Commander, Airborne Combat Command, Kostrad, with major responsi­
bilities in East Timor as Commander, Security Operations Command, 
East Timor.
85 Commander, Kodam 10.




60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Defense Attache, Bonn.
? Assistant-5 (Planning), Kodam VII.
-85 Brig. Gen. Deputy Governor, General and Army Division, Armed 
Forces' Academy.
85- Assistant-5 (Research and Planning) to the Army Chief of Staff.
Syaukat Banjaransari 
b. c. 1937.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Head, Bureau for P re sid e n tia l Security, President's Military
Secretariat.
? Defense Attache, New Delhi and Colombo.
-85 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
85- Assistant-3 (Personnel) to the Army Chief of Staff.
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Abbreviations
Akabri Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Indonesian Armed Forces’ 
Academy
Akad Zeni Akademi Zeni Engineers’ Academy
Aktekad Akademi Teknik Angkatan 
Darat
Army Technical Academy
AMN Akademi Militer Nasional Nasional Military Academy
B Brawijaya







KKo Korps Komando (Marinir) Marines
Kodaeral Komando Daerah Angkatan 
Laut
Regional Naval Command
Kodak Komando Daerah Kepolisian Police Area Command
Kodam Komando Daerah Militer Military Area Command
Kodau Komando Daerah Angkatan 
Udara
Air Force Area Command
Kodikau Komando Pendidikan Angkatan 
Udara
Air Force's Education 
Command
KMK Komando Militer Kota City Military Command
Kodim Komando Distrik Militer Military District Command
Kohanudnas Komando Pertahanan Udara 
Nasional
National Air Defense Command
Koops Komando Operasional Operational Command
Kopasgat Komando Pasukan Gerak Cepat Fast Action Force Command
Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus Special Forces' Command
Kopassandha Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha Army Paracommando Command 
(Special Forces)
Kopkamtib Komando Pemulihan Keamanan 
dan Ketertiban
Command for the Restoration 
of Security and Public 
Order
Kopur Komando Tempur Combat Command
Korem Komando Resort Militer Military Subarea Command
Kostrad Komando Strategi Angkatan 
Darat
Army Strategic Command
Kostranas Komando Strategi Nasional National Strategic Command
Kowilhan Komando Wilayah Pertahanan Defense Region Command
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KSAD (Kasad) Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat Army Chief of Staff
Kupaltu Kursus Perwira Lanjutan Satu Advanced Officers' Training 
Course I
Lantamal Pangkalan Utama Angkatan 
Laut
First Class Bases
Paswalpres Pasukan Pengawal Presiden Presidential Security Squad
P3AD Pusat Pendidikan Perwira 
Angkatan Darat
Army Officer Training Center




Seskoad Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Angkatan Darat
Army Staff and Command 
School
Seskogab Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
Gabungan
Joint Services' Staff and 
Command School
SI Siliwangi
Suslapa Kursus Lanjutan Perwira Officers' Advanced Course
